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/ 
[8. F. No. 17922. In Bank. Oct. 18, 1950.) 
KEY SYSTEM TRANSIT LINES (a Corporation), Petitioner, 
v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
~ 
[1] Prohibition - Other Remedies - Appeal - In an action for 
damages for personal injuries, where the court vacated ita 
order dismissing the case for want of prosecution, a peremptory 
writ of prohibition against further exercise of jurisdiction . 
in the case by that court was denied although, at the time 
of the vacation order, the right to appeal from snoh an order 
was DOt clear but was determined by the. Supreme Court in.' 
s later decision. 
[2] Judgments-Opening and Vaeating-8tatuto17 ProvisloDS.-
The recognized policy where a judgment or order set aside was 
in the exercise of a discretionary power not based on the merits 
of the action is that which requires a trial on the merits 
wherever possible, and this policy is regarded as the basis for 
the enactment of the provisions of Code Civ. Proc., 1473. 
[8] Appeal-Discretion of Lower Oourt.-Appellate courts will ! 
generally refrain from interfering on jurisdictional grounda 
with the trial' court's reconsideration of a discretionary order . 
not based on the merits of the litigation. 
[4] Judgments-Opening and Vacating-Authority of Oourt.-
A trial court has power independently of atatute to aet aside 
a judgment entered through the court's inadvertence. 
[1] See 21 OaLJur. 556; 42 Am.Jur. 144-
[4] See 14 OaLJur. 1009; 31 Am.Jur.177. 
McK. Dig. Referencea: [1J Prohibition, § 14(1); [2] Judgments, 
§ 148; [3J Appll8l and Error, § 1222, [4J Judgments, i 147; [6] 
Dismissal, I B6. 
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[6] Dismissal-Vacation of.-Where the coort through iDadver-
teDce aDd mistake in overlookiDg matters of record and faets 
within its judicial knowledge dismiues aD actioD for waDt of 
prosecutioD, it may in the exercise of its inhereDtpowers set 
aside or vacate sueb dismissal. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to prevent the Superior 
Court of Alameda County from exercising jurisdiction in an 
action. Writ denied. 
Donahue, RiChards, Rowell & Gallagher and Bryant M. 
Bennett for Petitioner. 
Emmett R. Burns, William C. Burns, Fred Rosser and F. E. 
Kilpatrick for Real Parties in Interest. 
SHENK, J .-The petitioner seeks the writ of prohibition 
to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the respondent court 
in the trial of an action to recover d8.IIUlges for penwuai 
injuries brought by Grace M. and Collis P. Joseph. 
The action against the petitioner was commenced un No-
vember 15, 1945. Summons was served on November 29, 1946, 
concurrently with a substitution, of attorneys. The defend-
ant's answer was ':6led on January 7, 1947. On January 8, 
1948, the petitioner noticed a motion to dismiss the action for 
failure to bring it to trial within two years from the time of 
filing (Code Civ. Proc., § 583). On January 15th the motion 
was granted. On January 31st the plainti1fs filed a notice of 
motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The motion was 
granted by the same judge who made the former order and 
8U bsequently the plaintiffs sought to set the cause for trial. 
The defendant, petitioner herein, thereupon filed the present 
petition alleging that the respondent court had no jurisdiction 
to vacate the prior order of dismissal. 
No appeal was taken from either order. It is the theory 
of the petitioner that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in 
vacating the order of dismissal; that the order was appealable 
(Southern Pacific B. B. Co. v. Willett, 216 Cal. 387 [14 P.2d 
526]), and was subject to be set aside only on appeal or by a 
motion pursuant to section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure; 
that neither the motion to vacate nor the order granting the 
motion was expressly or otherwise based on any ground per-
mitted by section 473, and that both the motion and the order 
were merely reagitation and involved a determination of the 
\ 
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aame issues presented on the hearing of the motio:\) to dismiss. 
The respondent contends that although section 473 was not 
expressly mentioned on the motion to vacate, the facts 88 
shown by the record indicate, that the court's jurisdiction 
could properly be deemed to have been exercised under that 
section or pursuant to its inherent power, and that this court 
should conclude that it was so, exercised. 
The order granting the motion to dismiss was based on the 
court's findings that more than two years bad e:s:pired since-"":' 
the commencement of the action; that the delay in bringing '1' 
the action to trial had been inexcusable; that the, defendant's ',. 
rights had been greatly prejudiced, and that during the period 
since the filing of the complaint the defendant had an attor- _ 
ney maintaining offices in the city of Oakland. . 
The record shows that the following additional matters ' 
were considered on the motion to vacate the order: On Janu-
ary 9, 1947, and after the filing of the defendant's answer, 
a memorandum to set the case tor trial was filect. On Decem-
ber 22, 1947, a stipUlation was signed by the attorneys for 
both parties selecting January 12, 1948, 4S the trial date, 
and the case was set for trial accordingly. The defendant's 
motion to dismiss was made four days before the trial date ' ,~ 
agreed upon and the case was put off calendar btjause -orthEl 
pendency of the motion. Because of the congested state of the 
trial calendar an earlier date for the trial could not be pro.; 
cured. 
In the vacating order the court recited the additional mat-
ters and "upon a more complete presentation of the facts" 
concluded that there was no unnecessary delay in bringing 
the action to t:rial. nor any fault on the part of the plaintiffs, 
nor any prejudice to the rights of the defendant, and that 
to dismiss the action without a hearing on the merits would 
work an injustice upon the plaintiffs. 
Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure vests in the 
court the discretionary power to dismiss an action for want 
of prosecution on motion of the defendant, after due notice 
to the plaintiff, whenever the latter bas failed to bring the 
action to trial for two years after the complaint was filed. 
A consideration of the jurisdictional issue will determine 
the outcome without the necessity of considering other ques-
tions. A stipulation of the parties setting the case for trial, 
entered into after the expiration of two years from the filing 
of the complaint, was a matter of record in the respondent 
court. It must be assumed that the congested state of the 
/ 
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trial calendar was within the court's judicial know\edge. It 
is also shown by the record that both matters of· fact had 
been inadvertently overlooked by the court in making the 
first order. The petitioner contends that such inadvertence 
IIl1d mistake were not available to set aside that order under 
!oo"l~tion 473 as action taken against a party through his mis-
lal'l" inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect nor to sup-
plll't the subsequent order as an exercise of the court's inher. 
('lit power to correct action taken through its own inadvertence 
or mistake of fact. The petitioner urges that anj' inadver-
tence or mistake here appearing is a matter solely of judicial 
error reviewable on appeal from the first order. . 
[1] The arguments of the petitioner invoke application of 
the policy requiring finality of judgments and orders. That 
policy generally controls where a judgment or order is entered 
after a trial on the merits of the litigation. (Drinkhouse v. 
Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 369 [260 P. 869] ; StetJem v. Superior 
Court, 7 Cal.2d 110 [59P.2d 988].) [2] But the policy 
bas not been deemed controlling where the judgment or order 
set aside was in the exercise of a discretionary power not based 
on the merits of the action. The recognized policy in such 
USCI:! is ,that which requires a trial on the merits wherever 
possible.' The lattuPollcyhas -oeeJiSiid W"be- tlfe -basis -for 
the enactment of the provisions of section 473. (,)owman v. 
Bowman, 29 Cal.2d 808, 8131178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246] ; 
Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal.2d 274, 279 [148 P.2d 611,153 A.L.R. 
442].) [3] In giving e1fect to that policy appellate courts 
ha"e generally refrained from interfering on jurisdictional 
grounds with the trial court's reconsideration of a" discretion-
ary order not based on the merits of the litigation. (See 
Kenney v. KeUeher, 63 Cal. 442; De la Beckwith v. Superior 
Court, 146 Cal. 496 [80 P. 717]; Glougie v. SuperiorOourt, 
169 Cal. 675 [147 P. 927] ; Harth, v. Ten Eyck, 16 Ca1.2d 829 
[108 P.2d 675] ; McDonald V. 86fJ6rY, 6 Cal.2d 629, 631 [59 
P.2d 98J; Watkim v. J[cOartney,70 Cal.App. 137 [232 P. 
982].) 
[4] This court has also recognized the power of the trial 
court independently of statute to set aside a default judgment 
entered through the court's inadvertence. {PhiUips v. T",-
sheim,25 Ca1.2d 913, 916 [156 P.2d 25].} In 1 Freeman on 
Judgments (5th ed.) p. 432, it is said that where the court is 
deceived or is Jaboring undE'r a mistake or misapprehension 
as to the state of the record or as to the existence of extrinsic 
. I 
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~acts upou which its action is predicated, it has inherent 
'power to vacate a judgment which would not otherwise have 
been rendered. That principle was applied by this court in 
setting aside one of its own jUdgments. almost three yeaI'l 
after it was rendered because the first order was made on the 
theory that the defendant had not moved for a new trial when 
in fact he had done so. (I'll re Rothrock, 14 Oal.2d 34 [92 
P.2d 634].) 
[6] Here the later order was in effect based on the inad. 
vertence and mistake of the court in overlooking matters of 
record and facts within the court's judicial knowledge. On ita 
face the record does not disclose invalidity for lack of juris-
diction. The order was within the court's general jurisdic. 
tion. It was made in the exercise of its inherent power under 
that jurisdiction. Factual sufficiency to support the exercise 
of the power is not controverted by the record. The. intend. 
ments which govern are controlling to support the propriety 
of the exercise of jurisdiction. (Phelan v. 8upM'ior Courl, 
35 Oal.2d 363 [217 P.2d 951J.) 
The peremptory writ is denied. 
::;~:"'o~i.~~::~~r~i~~.=.ordina~lY, if there is a rlght-~i 
to an immediate review by appeal that remedy is considered . 
adequate, and prohibition will not lie unless the petitioner 
can show some special reason why the remedy of appeal is i 
rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his . 
ease. (See Phelan v. Superior Court. 35 Oa1.2d 363, 370 
[217 P.2d 9511.) The order under attack, from which no 
appeal was taken, is a special order after final judgment which 
petitioner claims was in excess of jurisdiction and void. It 
was held in the Phelan case, which was decided after peti. 
tioner applied for the writ herein, that such an order is 
appealable, but prior thereto its appealability was uncertain. 
Although it has now been established that petitioner had an 
adequate remedy by appeal, the availability of that remedy 
was not clear at the time the order of vacation was made and, 
accordingly, we should permit the writ to be used to test the 
question of jurisdiction. (Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Oal. 
2d 363, 371 [217 P.2d 951].) 
The court's jurisdiction to proceed with the trial depends 
on whether it had power to vl\cnte the prior judgment of dis· 
missal. In addition to the authority given by Code of Civil 
) 
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pr&edure section 473 to set aside judgments or orders which 
are. void, or are the result of clerical mistake or of a party'. 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, a trial· 
cou,rt has inherent power under some circumstances to set 
IIllide judgments and orders which it has made inadvertently 
Illld which are not actually the result of the exercise of judg. 
ment. (Bastajitm v. Brown, 19 CaL2d 209, 214-216 [120 P. 
2<19]; Oarpenter v. PGOific Mut. Life 1m. 00., 14 Cal.2d 704, 
708·710 [96 P.2d 796]; Estate 01 GoZdberg, 10 Cal.2d. 709, 
713·716 [76 P.2d 508] ; Oarter v. J. W. Siwer Trucking 00., 
4:Ca1.2d 198, 203·205 [47 P.2d 733]; Lauchere v. Lambert, 
210 Cal. 274, 276·278 [291 P. 412] ; Bob.on v. 8uperior Oourt, 
]71 Cal. 588, 590·593 [154 P. 8] ; Wiggin v. 8uperior Oourt, 
68 Cal. 398, 400-4:03 [9 P. 646].) Error which is essentially 
judicial, however, rather than clerical or inadvertent, may 
not be corrected under the court's inherent power but only 
under appropriate statutory procedure, and a court may not 
vacate a judgment or order merely because it fat1ed to consider 
or give the proper weight or effect to some evidence before it. 
(Phillips v. TnuJuim, 25 Cal.2d 913, 916 [156 P.2d 25]; 
Bastaiian v. Brown,19 Ca1.2d 209, 214-216 [120 P.2d 9] ; Es· 
'ate 01 Burnett, 11 Cal.2d 259, 262 [79 P.2d 89] ; 8tetJBfU v. 
8uperior Court, 7 Cal.2d 110, 112-114 [59 P.2d 988] ; Dyer. 
wZe Mfg. Co. v. BeUer, 102 Cal. 615, 617 [36 P. 928] ; Egan 
v:Egan,90 Cal. 15,20.22 [27 P. 22]; see Drinkkouse v. Van 
Ness,202 Cal 359, 369 [260 P. 869].) 
.. Here the order of vacation does not aflirmatively show that 
it was made on grounds recognized by section 473 or on the 
ground that there had been some judicial inadvertence. How· 
ever, since petitioner is making a collateral attack upon the 
order, we must indulge in every presumption in support of 
the order, and any condition of facts consistent with its 
validity and not aflirmatively contradicted by the judgment 
roll will be presumed to have existed. (Phelaft v. 8uperior 
Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 374·375 [217 P.2d 951]; WelZs Pargo 
cf 00. v. Cuy etc. of 8an Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 (152 P.2d 
625] ; Boremtein v. Boremtein, 20 CaL2d 379, 381 [125 P.2d 
465].) It is, of course, true that where the trial court's order 
shows without question the basis for the action, it will be 
deemed to speak the truth on that point. (See Hahn v. Kelly, 
34 Cal. 391, 405 et seq. [94 Am.Dec. 742] ; Kaufmann v. OaU. 
fornia Mining etc. 8yn., 16 Ca1.2d 90, 93-94 [104 P.2d 10381 ; 
Grinbaum v. S,'.perior Oourt, 192 Cal. 528, 546-550 [221 P. 
I 
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635] ; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Costa, 171 Cal. 138, 140 _' 
[152 P. 296); Johnston v. Southern Pacific Co., 150 Cal. 585, . 
537 [89 P. 348, 11 Ann.Cas. 841).} '1 
Under the general rule on collateral attack, there can be 
no question that, if the trial judge had merely ordered vaca- -
tion of the judgment, without making any recitals or state-
ments that might be construed as reasons for his action, the 
presumption in favor of validity would prevail, and the order 
of vacation would stand. There is language, however, in" 
Treat v. Stl.perior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 636, 641 [62 P.2d 147), to .. 
the effect that an order made on the ground of judicial inad-
vertence should so specify, "and that in the absence of any 
such statement, the action of the trial court cannot be upheld 
on such a hypothesis." No authority was cited and no reason 
was given for this holding, and it is clearly in conflict with ' 
the long recognized general principle relating to collateral 
attack, that in the absence of contrary statements in the 
record we must pr('snme any condition of facts consistent with 
tIle \'alidity of a judgment or order of a court of general juris-
diction. The requirement of an express recital of the ground 
of judicial inadvertence constitutes an unwarranted refine-.. j 
ment of the general rule (cf. Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 
Cal.2d 363, 373 [217 P.2d 951]), and this portion of the Treaf-· 
casc should not be followed. 
The principal question in this case, therefore, is whether·· 
the recitals in the order of vacation preclude application of 
the presumption in favor of validity. 
The order recites that it appeared to the court "upon fur-
ther consideration and a more complete presentation of the 
facts" that there was no unnecessary or inexcusable delay 
on the part of plaintiffs, and that it further appeared "after 
full consideration of the facts and personal knowledge of the 
Court of the time required to bring such an action to trial" 
that the rights of ddendant had not been prejudiced through 
any fault of the plaintiffs. We cannot tell what facts were 
presented or considered on the second hearing, and for all 
that appears in the record a showing may have been made 
which justified vacation of the order under flection 473 or on 
the ground of judicial inadvertence. Weare not required 
. to speculate as to what showing was made or as to what 
grounds were relied upon by the court in support of its 
action. There is nothinA'- in the recitals of the order of vaca-
tion or elsewhere in tIl!> recoril whit'h would foreclose the 
presumption of any I:ltate of facts necessary to support the 
.) 
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order as a proper exercise of the court's statutory or inherent 
powers, and we must assume that such facts were before the 
trial court as would justify it in vacating the judgment of 
dismissal. 
For these reasons 1 concur in the denial of the peremptor), 
writ. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J .-1 dissent. 
On January 8, 1948, petitioner,defeildant in an action for 
damages, noticed a motion to dismiss the action under section 
583 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failure to bring it to 
tria] within two years from the time of filing. On January 
15th, after a hearing at which both parties were represented 
by counsel, it was ordered that the action be dismissed. The 
judgment of dismissal was appealable. (Southern Pacific 
It R. Co. v. Willett, 216 Cal. 387 [14 P.2d 526]; Neustadt v . 
• ')kernsweU, 99 Cal.App.2d 293 [221 P.2d 694j; Code Div. 
I'roc., § 581(d).) Instead of appealing, however, plaintiffs 
filed a notice of motion to vacate the judgment. On March 8, 
1948, the trial court granted the motion to vacate. No appeal 
was taken from· tb~ order vacating the judgment :-of liismissal.· 
1'ctitioner contends that the order was in excess of jurisdictiun 
and seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial of the 
acti{)Il. It is now settled that the order was appealable 
whether or not it was void (Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 
Cal.2d 363 1217 P.2d 951]), but it was uncertain at the time 
tht> order WfiS entered whether petitioner had a remedy by 
"JlJ.":<11. Petitioner is therefore permitted to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the court in this proceeding. (Phelan v. Su-
perior Court, Bupra.) 
Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the 
grl.unds upon which tbe trial court may relieve a party from 
a l-leviously entered judgment or order. "The court may, 
upon such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal 
tepresentative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding 
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect. Application for such rl'lief mus~ be 
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading prt;. 
posed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall no't 
be granted, and must be made within a r<.'asonabll' time, in 
no ease .exceeding six months, after such judgment, (\l'der or 
Pl'O~ding was taken. \ 
\ 
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I "The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or 
~. motion, colTectclerical mistakes in its judgment·· rders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or 
. ected, and may, on motion of either party after nOl:J.1I81l1 
, to the other party, set aside any void judgment or .... <1, .......... 
In addition to its powers under section 473, the trial 
may correct an inadvertent mistake within a reasonable 
after entry of the judgment or order. "If the judgment 
entered .•• through the inadve$Dce or improvideJ)ce 
the t!ial court, it had the power independent of statute, 
correct the mistake by amending or setting aside the . 
ment, , [citations 1, as this presents no question of ju(]lieilll1 
review upon the merits. However, judicial error which oecura . 
in the rendition of orders or judgments which are the fault . 
of an exercise of judicial discretion may not be corrected 
except by statutory procedure. (8tevens v. Superior Oourt,. 
'1 Ca1.2d 110 [59 P.2d 988].)" (Phillip. v. Trwheim, 25.oat. 
2d 913, 916 [156 P.2d 25].) ~'. 
The basic question in this ease, therefore, is whether 
order vacating the judgment of dismissal was 
under section 473 or on the ground of judicial inJlLdv,ertmee. 
'Neither the motion nor the order of vacation was based J any ground mentioned in -section '478. This 'C8Se is 
. in which a judgment was taken against a party uthrough 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, '! ,.o&:.~~ 
which there were "clerical mistakes," or in which there wail 
a void order that could be set aside under the last paragraph 
of the section. 
Nor does it appear that the court was deceived or that' it . 
acted under any mistake as to the state of the record: The 
judgment of dismissal was entered after a contested hearing 
at which counsel for both parties were present. If plainti«a " 
were not at fault in failing to bring the action to trial, it was .. 
their duty to present evidence to show the facts. If they .' 
failed to do so, or if the court failed to give due weight to ' 
their evidence, they cannot claim that. the court acted inad· 
vertently. 'Plaintiffs' sole contention in their motion to vacate' , 
and supporting affidavit was that the court f811ed to take into 
account the crowded trial calendar and the consequent im· 
possibility of bringing the action to trial sooner. The crowded 
calendar, however, was clearly within the knowledge of both 
the court and counsel. There is no claim that the first order 
was not the one intend('d by tbe court or that it was made 
irregularly. The court changed its earlier ruling because it 
I 
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had failed to give due weight to the crowded trial calendar, 
a matter clearly before it when It made its first ruling. That 
fuilure wa~ judicial error not subject to correction on a motion 
w vacate. 
It is suggested that the failure of 8 trial court to specify 
tlte grounds upon wbich it vacated an earlier order prevents 
this court from affirming the later order. (Treat v. SuperIOr 
Court,7 Ca1.2d 636, 641 [62 P.2d 147].) We bave recently 
reiterated, however, that an order attacked collaterally. as 
here by prohibition, may be supported by a presumption of 
fllcts consistent with its validity. (Phelan v. Superior Court, 
35 Ca1.2d 363, 372 [217 P.2d 951]; Wells Fargo ct Co. v. 
San Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 [152 P.2d 625].) It cannot 
reasonably be contended, however, tbat this presumption will 
prevail over contrary statements in tbtl record. [Phelan v. 
Superior Court, supra, at 373-374.) The record in this case 
shows beyond tbe protective reacb of any presumption of 
validity that the order of March 8, 1948, was an attempt to 
reexamine th~ issues decided on January 15,1948. Tbe order 
of dismissal of that date was made because it appeared to the 
trial court after a proper bearing that "the delay in bringing 
said action to trial has been inexcusable and has not been 
caused by the defendant Key System, Inc., ... that the 
rights of the defendant ... have been greatly prejudiced 
... " Plaintiffs' sole ground for the motion to vacate was that 
the original order was an abuse of discretion resulting in 
in,lustice. The motion was supported by an affidavit explain-
ing plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the action The affidavit 
relied upon tbe crowded trial calendar and emphasized that 
t he trial court bad discretion to deny the motion to dismiss. 
Nothing was brougbt before the trial court in the notice of 
llIotion to vacate or the supporting affidavit that would justify 
Iln order under section 473, so that it can only be inferred 
that the trial court was asked to reverse its earlier order be-
cause of judicial error in that ruling, namely, failure to give 
due weight to the congested trial I'.alendar. 
The order itself sets forth the grounds therefor and neJ!''i-
tives the presumption that it was based on grounds sper jfieo 
by section 473 or other proper grounds. It recites: "It Nnw 
Appearing to the Court upon further consideration an(1 a 
more complete presentation of th(' facts that thert' W8f no 
unnec('ssary delay on the part of plaintiffs in bringing this 
Ie C.2d-'l 
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action to trial or any delay on the part of plaintiffs that WII J 
inexcusable, and the Court being further of the opinion that"~ 
to dismiss said action without any hearing on the merita1 
would work an injustice upon plaintiffs through no fault of j 
their own; and It Further Appearing to the Court after full 'A 
I.lonsideretlon of the facts and personal knowledge of the .. "~. 
Court of the time required to bring such an action to trial in "," 
1 his County that the rights of the defendant have not beea ," 
prejudiced through any fault of the plaintiffs in this actioli. ... , 
Thus, the trial court did not rely upon" [a party's] mistake,--
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," or mention that 
the order was a "clerical mistake" or that it was void 01' 
that it was entered by inadvertence. The court speaks of 
"further consideration" and "a more complete presentation 
of the facts," "full consideration of the facts" and "personal 
knowledge of the Court of the time required to bring such 
an action to trial. " Yet the crowded condition of the trial 
calendar must have been within the "personat knowledge 
of the Court" on January 15th, ,when the order of dismissal ", 
was granted. In the light of the grounds urged in the, 
notice of motion to vacate and the supporting affidavit, the .. ~ 
quoted language of the order compels the conclusion that tl1~~: 
:. court granted the motion to rectify an earlier decision, made. :: 
" after a full hearing and argument, but later deemed errone-,: 
ous because of the court's failure to give due weight to "thtf.;: 
crowded trial calendar. It cannot be presumed, therefore, .) 
that the court was acting under section 473 or on the ground' . 
of judicial inadvertence. If the presumption is controlling 
in this case, where the grounds on which the order was based 
are so clear, it will preclude collateral attack on virtually any 
order vacating a judgment. j " 
It is nevertheless suggested that the "policy requiring fi-
nality of judgments and orders," which generally controls 
when a judgment or order is entered after a trial on the merits, 
"has not been deemed controlling where the judgment or 
order set aside was in the exercise of a discretionary power 
not based on the merits of the action. The required policy 
in such eases is that which requires a trial on the merits 
wherever possible." It is true that there is a policy favor-
ing disposition of cases on their tnerits. That policy finds 
expression in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
section 473, which grants relief within a prescribed time 
limit to parties defeated by their "mistake, inadvertence, 
\ ' 
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surprise or excusable neglect." (Bowman v. Bowman, 29 
Cal.2d 808, 813 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246].) 
It does not follow, however. that "in giving effect to that 
policy appellate courts havt> generally refrained from inter-
f"ring on jurifldictional grounds with the trial court's recon-
... cieration of Ii discretionary order not based on the Dlerits 
.. I' til(' litigation." In Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Cal.2d .913 
,I;)ti P.2d 25), Wells Fargo & Co. v. San Francisco, 25 Cal. 
:.'.1 a7 (152 P.2d 625], and Bowman v. Bowman, 29 Ca1.2d 
,,08 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246], this court did not hesi-
tllf(- to interfert> with the trial court's reconsideration of dis-
"retionary orders not based on the merits of the litigation. 
(See, also, Barlow v. City Cou'neil of Ingle1ll0od. 32 Ca1.2d 
fi88 [197 P.2d 721J (error for trial court to vacate judgment 
on rlemurrer based on statute of limitations).) Ht'retofore, 
there bas been no attempt to distinguish th£' correction of 
jndicial error in orders not based on the merits of. the liti-
Ifation from the correction of judicial error in other type!" 
uf judgments or orders. Such a distinction would hav£' the 
undesirable eft'ect of creating classes of appealable judg-
Jnents-some of indeterminate finality. which the trial court 
has power to vacate at its whim outside the statutory proce-
dure, and sdIne that it cannot vacate after entry of judgment. 
except as provided by $tatute. 
The trial court has no power to correct judicial error in 8 
final judgment or an appealable special order after final 
.illdl!ment except as provided by statute. (Coombs v. Hib-
berd, 43 Cal. 452; Lang v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 491 [12 P. 
306. 416) ; Carpenter v. Supenor Oot('rt, 75 Cal. 596 f19 P 
]741; Holtum v. Grief. 144 Cal. 521 {78 P. 11}: Dnnlrh.oll!UI 
v Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359 [260 P. 869] : Lallktoll v. Rupennr 
COllrt,5 Cal.2d 694 [55 P.2d 1170] [Disapproved on anothf'r 
iRRlle in Phelan v. Superior Court. 35 Cal.2d 363 J2]7 P 2rl 
951] : Stevens v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.2d 110 f59 P.2rl 9RSI ; 
Phillips v. Trusheim, 25 Cal.2d 913 [156 P.2d 251; Well.~ 
Pargo & 00. v. San Prancisco, 25 Ca1.2d 37 f152 P.2rl G2!) 1 : 
Bowman v. Bowman. 29 Ca1.2d 808 [178 P.2d 751. 170 A.L.R. 
2461; Barlow v. Oitll Council of Inglewood. 32 Cal.2rl flRR 
1197 P.2d 721]; cf. Beber v. Hoffschn.eiiler. 104 Cal 4:)5 
ra8 P. 312] : Sf>e E!!tote· of SItr1lett, 11 {'a1.2d 259. 262 '79 
P.2d 89]; Basta.finn v. Brown. 19 Ca1.2d 209. 214 '1120 P. 
2d 91 : 30 Cal.J ... Rf'v 7 !'i. \ EYf'n if thf' trial conr1 al'h-d haRtily 
IInrl ill-advisedly in making its first order, it is not for t.his 
/ 
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eourt to disregard settled rules of procedure and practice.·~ 
Such disregard can result only in confusion. As thiE court'rl 
said in one of its earliest cases on this subject, "Ther~ mUst: 
be some point where litigation in the lower Court terminates, . 
and the losing party is turned over to tbe appellatt' Court.' 
for redress." (Coombs v. Hibberd, 43 Cal. 452, 454.) 
The writ should issue as prayed. 
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Petitiollt'r's applicatioll for a rebt'aring was denlf>d Novem~ 
b('l' 16. 19:,0. Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted '. 
for a renearlllg. 
